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Presidential War Powers and Humanitarian
Intervention
Michael J. Sherman*

Abstract
Does the fact that Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution reserves to Congress the authority to “declare war”
mean that the president needs congressional approval before
using military force?1 As this Article discusses, there are a range
of answers to this question. The Article examines this debate in
the context of humanitarian intervention, i.e. military actions
taken, not for purposes of conquest, but instead to stop largescale, serious violations of human rights. If the president wishes
to use the military for these purposes, should he have more
authority under the Constitution to do so? Less? The same?
What this Article suggests is that the concerns which drove the
Founders to place limits on the President’s war powers, especially
the fear that a glory-seeking chief executive would precipitously
use the military in order to serve his own desire for fame, are not
as serious when it comes to humanitarian intervention.
Presidents are unlikely to significantly enhance their short-term
popularity or historical legacies by using the military in this way.
As a result, there is less reason to fear that they will be incautious
in these situations. In addition, it is possible to establish
standards by which to judge presidential action in this arena,
placing another effective limit on the President. In light of the
reduced risks, as well as the terrible costs of inaction in the face
of grave human rights crises, we should accept some flexibility
for the President to decide to intercede for humanitarian reasons.

LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. University of Michigan. The
author is an attorney with the federal government. The views expressed here
are solely his own.
1. U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 11.
*
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Introduction
Constitutional debates about the degree of power the
president should have to engage the United States in military
action are hardly new. Commentators have proposed an array
of answers to this question, ranging from very restrictive views
of the President’s war-making power to especially broad visions
of this authority. Naturally, there are also those who have taken
more moderate positions than either of these two extremes. This
Article considers the question of presidential war powers in the
context of humanitarian intervention. It will explore the degree
of license the president should possess to commence military
action if it is for humanitarian purposes. Should the President’s
war making authority, whatever it may be, be greater in these
settings? Should it be lessened? Should it be no different than in
other contexts?
This Article suggests there should not be as much concern
over abuse of power by a Commander in Chief in calling out the
armed forces for humanitarian purposes and, therefore,
presidents should have at least some flexibility to initiate
military action for legitimate humanitarian causes.
The
troubling incentives that exist for presidents to use the military
for selfish, self-promoting reasons in other contexts do not exist
to the same degree in the case of humanitarian intervention. On
a related note, public opinion is likely to act as a brake on
presidential action in these situations. Finally, humanitarian
interventions are generally smaller scale operations involving
less risk to (at least) American life, meaning that the cost of
abuse of power by the president will be lower. This is not to say
that presidents should engage in such actions at the drop of a
hat; there needs to be due consideration as to what criteria
should be used to judge a proposed intervention. Such standards
should also guard against presidential abuse of military
authority in this arena, again reducing the risk that presidents
will misuse their power.
As a starting point, this Article will first discuss some of the
main lines of thought about the president’s war-making powers
under the Constitution. It will then examine the idea behind
humanitarian intervention and the related concept of
Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”). While the definition of

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2

2

ARTICLE 2_SHERMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS

8/23/2019 6:29 PM

599

humanitarian intervention is further discussed below,2 for now
this Article will broadly define it as foreign intervention or
military action whose primary goal is not necessarily a victory
over an enemy state’s armed forces (or a non-state actor’s armed
forces), but is instead directed to relieve or end a serious
violation of human rights involving civilians or others who are
hors de combat (literally “outside the fight”; for these purposes,
essentially not engaged in military encounters). Understanding
the rationales grounding the theories of the president’s warmaking authority will help determine whether his power should
be enhanced, diminished, or unchanged when considering use of
military force for humanitarian reasons.
Theories of the President’s War Making Powers Under the
Constitution: The Restrictive, Pro-Congress View
The restrictive view maintains that the president’s
authority to commit United States forces to armed conflict in the
absence of congressional assent—either through a declaration of
war or some sort of statutory authorization—is quite limited. In
this telling, the president needs congressional approval for just
about anything more than defensive action to repel an attack.
This viewpoint draws its support primarily from the
constitutional text and its delegation to Congress of the power to
“declare war”3 and appropriate funds for the armed forces.4
However, its proponents can also cite to a significant number of
statements made by the Founders indicating it was precisely
their intent to limit the ability of any one person to bring the
United States to a state of war.
John Hart Ely was one of the restrictive view’s champions.
To Ely, the question of whether Congress or the president had
the primary authority to commence hostilities was not a close
one. He famously opened his book, War and Responsibility, by
stating that:

2. See infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
4. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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[F]rom the standpoint of twentieth-century
observers, the ‘original understanding’ of the
document’s framers and ratifiers can be obscure to
the point of inscrutability. Often this is true. In
this case, however, it isn’t. The power to declare
war was constitutionally vested in Congress. The
debates, and early practice, establish that this
meant that all wars, big or small, ‘declared’ in so
many words or not—most weren’t, even then—
had to be legislatively authorized.5
Ely explained that Congress was specifically given this
power to make it difficult for the country to go to war. In other
words, as George Mason put it, the Founders wanted to “‘clog’
the road to combat.”6 They feared that the executive would be
more anxious to fight wars than the legislature, so the less
combative branch was inserted into the process.7 This decision
rested on the theory that it would be harder to get a larger
number of people on board with a given action than if the
decision were to be left to a single individual.8 The House was
included in this process, unlike the approval process for treaties
and many presidential appointments in which the legislative
role is limited to the Senate.9 Its inclusion was probably due to
its closer relationship to the population as a whole, i.e. those who
would be fighting and paying the most direct costs of any
decision to go to war.10 At Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention,
James Wilson, who had participated in the writing of the
Constitution, defended the document in part by asserting that
power was divided in such a way that “[i]t will not be in the
power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in
[war]; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the

5. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
6. Id. at 4; see also M. Andrew Campanelli et al., The Original
Understanding of the Declare War Clause, 24 J.L. & POL. 49, 54 (2008)
(discussing Mason’s views).
7. See ELY, supra note 5, at 4.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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legislature at large.”11 Jon Michaels writes:
[T]he United States would also be a great
democracy: its decisions would reflect the will of
the citizenry. Hence, Congress as the most direct
representatives of the People, would necessarily
be involved in military policy, simultaneously
promoting the virtues of limited government by
checking the perceived natural inclinations of the
strong Executive and upholding the ideals of
democracy by remaining the true servants of the
People. Moreover, decisions by the president to
wage war could not be undertaken without first
benefiting from the deliberative insights of a
legislative assembly and without concomitantly
securing the tacit blessings and consent of the
citizenry.12
More recently, when President Obama was considering how
to respond to Syria’s use of chemical weapons, commentators
who argued that any action would require congressional
involvement referenced Mason’s language. Doug Bandow has
suggested that the president would need to consult Congress,
and this was the very design intended by the Founders,
including Mason, to “clog” up the road to war.13 Similarly, David
Cole opined in the New York Review of Books in defense of the
President’s consultation with Congress, staking the claim that
“[g]oing to Congress did clog war,” but this very clogging would
lead to a better long-term resolution to the problem of Syria’s
use of chemical weapons.14
11. See Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1637, 1648–49 (2000) (internal citation omitted).
12. Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional,
Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
1001, 1051–52 (2004).
13. See Doug Bandow, Bomb Syria? President Obama Must Go to
Congress for a Declaration of War, CATO INST. (Aug. 30, 2013),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/bomb-syria-president-obamamust-go-congress-declaration-of-war.
14. See David Cole, Clogging the War Machine, N.Y. REV. DAILY (Sept. 19,
2013, 9:10 AM), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/09/19/syria-clogging-
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Louis Fisher is another well-known advocate of the
restrictive view. Fisher makes the point that the Founders were
concerned with creating an executive with limited powers in
comparison to the British monarch whose rule they had only
recently thrown off. He notes that, in The Federalist, Alexander
Hamilton—one of the staunchest supporters of strong executive
power of his generation—stated that the American president
would be “less threatening” to the people than an English king,
precisely because the former lacked the power to declare war or
raise an army.15 Fisher also mentions that when President
Washington used the militia to protect Americans living on the
frontier from hostile Indian attacks, he understood his authority
to be strictly limited to defensive measures. Any offensive plans
against tribal forces would first have to be authorized by
Congress.16 As James Baker points out, this defense versus
offense distinction also represented former President (and
future Chief Justice) Taft’s view more than a century later.17
In expounding on why the Founders thought it so important
to create an executive whose war making powers would be more
circumscribed than the British monarch’s, both Fisher and
William Treanor18 assert that the Founders saw the possibility
of an executive becoming motivated (far more so than Congress)
to engage in war out of a desire for fame. Fisher points to
Federalist No. 4, in which John Jay wrote that “absolute
monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get
nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such
as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts,
war-machine/ (emphasis in original).
15. See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1645; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at
398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
16. See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1653; see also Robert Bejesky, War
Powers Pursuant to False Perceptions and Asymmetric Information in the “Zone
of Twilight,” 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 26–27 (2012) (discussing Washington’s
views).
17. See JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 179–80 (2007) (internal citation omitted); see also
Bejesky, supra note 16, at 32 (discussing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 591 (1889), in which the Court took note of the previous Secretary of
State, William Marcy’s expressed viewpoint that the president lacked
authority to initiate offensive hostilities with another country).
18. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to
Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997).
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ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their
particular families or partisans.”19 Unlike the executive,
Treanor argues, “individual members of Congress would not win
fame if the nation went to war and won.”20
Both authors cite to Madison’s Helvidius letters, written
during the neutrality crisis of 1793. The United States was
trying to avoid being drawn into the ongoing conflict between
France and Great Britain.21 The question arose whether
President Washington could issue a proclamation of neutrality.22
Secretary of State Jefferson argued that this was beyond the
President’s power, because he could no more pronounce that
there would not be a war (i.e. that the U.S. would remain
neutral) than he could declare that there would be one.23 The
Helvidius letters were published in support of Jefferson’s
position and in response to Treasury Secretary Hamilton’s
Pacificus letters claiming that the President could issue such an
edict.24
In the fourth Helvidius letter, Madison contended that:
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be
found than in the clause which confides the
question of war or peace to the legislature, and not
to the executive department. . . . [T]he trust and
the temptation would be too great for any one
man: not such as nature may offer as the prodigy
of many centuries, but such as may be expected in
the ordinary successions of magistracy. War is in
fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.25

19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 97–98 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987); see also Fisher, supra note 11, at 1651.
20. Treanor, supra note 18, at 700.
21. See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 14–20 (5th ed. Wolters Kluwer Law &
Bus. 2014).
22. See id. at 14.
23. See id. at 14–15.
24. See id. at 15–16.
25. Treanor, supra note 18, at 747 (quoting James Madison, “Helvidius”
Number 4, in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 108–09 (Robert Rutland et al.
eds., Virginia Univ. Press 1985)).
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Madison also noted that war is a temptation for the
executive in particular because:
It is in war . . . that laurels are to be gathered, and
it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The
strongest passions, and most dangerous
weaknesses of the human breast; ambition,
avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of
fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and
duty of peace.26
In summing up his own argument, Treanor writes that:
Combined, these statements about fame and war
strongly suggest why the Framers gave Congress
the power to declare war. First, these statements
are evidence of a widely-held belief among
Federalists and Antifederalists that kings—the
“executive” that they knew—had frequently led
their nations into war solely to achieve glory.
Second, they reveal a widespread conviction that
the passions that influenced leaders of a
monarchy would also hold sway over leaders of a
republic. Third, the statements reflect an
understanding that the President, the head of the
new executive branch, was the governmental
official most likely to pursue fame. These
statements lead to the logical, if unexpressed,
conclusion that the President could not be trusted
with the power to declare war because, in order to
achieve glory, he would lead the nation into war
when it was not in the national interest.27
Thus, because the executive may have the most to gain
personally from a decision to go to war, he should not be the one
entrusted to make that determination. As Robert Delahunty
26. Madison, supra note 25, at 108; see also Fisher, supra note 11, at
1651–52; Treanor, supra note 18, at 747.
27. Treanor, supra note 18, at 745.
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notes, the rise of Napoleon likely confirmed for the Founders
that their fears of a glory-seeking executive had been wellfounded.28
Treanor points to solid empirical evidence to support the
Founders’ fears. He writes that “[a] concern with how they
would be remembered has driven many Presidents.”29 As it
turns out, a number of studies have found a correlation between
time spent at war during a particular presidential
administration and positive views of that administration.30 In
particular, Treanor references one study which considered
previous scholarship on this topic and found that, other than
years in office, years spent at war had the strongest positive
correlation with ranking of presidential satisfaction.31 Thus,
there is good reason to fear that a president will succumb to the
temptation to lead the country into battle as a means of
enhancing his own historical legacy.32 As a result, the decision
to go to war should be taken out of the president’s hands, or at
least should not be in his hands alone.
Marty Lederman, though not in the restrictive camp, makes
the case that international law also places limits on the
president’s authority to initiate hostilities on his own. In April
2017, when President Trump ordered the bombing of a Syrian
airfield, Lederman argued that this sort of unprovoked strike on
Syrian territory by the U.S. violated Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter.33 The relevant portion of this provision says that
28. See Robert J. Delahunty, Structuralism and the War Powers: The
Army, Navy and Militia Clauses, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1034 (2003)
(stating “[w]ithin the lifetimes of many of the Founders, a figure rose up in
Europe—Napoleon Bonaparte—in whom these dangers were personified to
perfection”).
29. Treanor, supra note 18, at 761.
30. See id. at 768 (internal citations omitted).
31. See id. (citing Dean Keith Simonton, Presidential Greatness: The
Historical Consensus and Its Psychological Significance, 7 POL. PSYCHOL. 259,
270–71 (1986)).
32. See Treanor, supra note 18, at 766 (quoting former Joint Chiefs
Chairman William J. Crowe saying that “to be a great president you have to
have a war” (internal citation omitted)). On the other end, there is a fear that
Presidents will refuse to seek peace for similar reasons: President Johnson
rejected attempts to end American involvement in Vietnam because he would
“not be the first President to lose a war.” Id. at 764 (internal citation omitted).
33. See Marty Lederman, Why the Strikes Against Syria Probably Violate
the U.N. Charter and (Therefore) the U.S. Constitution, JUST SEC. (Apr. 6,
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member states shall “refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.”34 Because the U.N. Charter
is a treaty ratified by the United States, it has the force of
binding (and supreme) domestic law, as per Article VI of the
Constitution.35 Lederman further points out that, to the extent
the U.S. can violate the terms of a previously ratified treaty, it
is only by means of congressional authorization.36 Thus, once
again, if a president wishes to attack another U.N. state, he
needs congressional approval first.37
The high-water mark for the advocates of the Restrictive
view appeared to be the 1973 passage of the War Powers
Resolution (“WPR”).38 This statute, passed into law over the veto
of President Nixon, ostensibly places important limits on the
president’s ability to commit American troops for long periods of
time without congressional approval. It first states that the
president in every possible instance “shall consult with Congress
before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances.”39 Once the military is
called into action, the president “shall consult regularly with the
Congress” for as long as American forces are fighting.40
Additionally, once the president sends soldiers into battle, he is
required to make a report to Congress within forty-eight hours.
This report must include a statement why American forces have
been employed, what the president’s authority for using them
was, and how long military action is expected to last.41 Perhaps
2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39674/syrian-strikes-violate-u-n-charterconstitution/ [hereinafter Why the Strikes].
34. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; see also Why the Strikes, supra note 33.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
36. See Why the Strikes, supra note 33.
37. See Marty Lederman, No, the President Cannot Strike North Korea
Without Congressional Approval,
JUST SEC.
(Aug.
10,
2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/44056/no-president-strike-north-koreacongressional-approval/ (explaining that, in August, 2017, Lederman used this
same logic to argue that the President could not make a first strike against
North Korea without congressional approval).
38. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2018).
39. Id. § 1542.
40. Id.
41. See id. § 1543.
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most importantly, according to the terms of the WPR, the
president is supposed to terminate the use of armed forces
within sixty days, unless he has received authorization from
Congress for continued use, Congress has granted a (one-time)
thirty-day extension of the deadline, or Congress is unable to
meet.42
If followed scrupulously, the WPR would indeed place
serious limits on a president’s ability to commit armed forces for
any lengthy period. In other words, the WPR was passed
specifically to prevent a repeat of American involvement in
Vietnam, at least without congressional agreement.43
However, it is not clear that the WPR has had a significant
impact on a president wishing to send out the troops. As James
Baker writes, “the [sixty-day] clock has generated considerable
debate, but has not in fact triggered the withdrawal of U.S.
armed forces.”44 Harold Koh adds that “[w]e should accept the
bitter truth that the War Powers Resolution has become
increasingly obsolete.”45 Naval Officer John Rolph offers an even
gloomier assessment, writing that “[d]espite the minor war
powers concessions that Congress has wrested from the
President since the Resolution’s enactment, the legislation has
proven to be an abysmal failure overall.”46
The WPR’s lack of effectiveness can be chalked up to a
number of factors. For one, many administrations have
questioned its constitutionality and/or supported its repeal.47
42. See id. § 1544.
43. See Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian
Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 991 (2016) (stating “it seemed clear that
the focus of the War Powers Resolution was as a ‘No More Vietnams’ statute”);
see also BAKER, supra note 17, at 183 (“[A]t the close of the Vietnam conflict,
the Congress sought to exercise its ‘war power’ prospectively through creation
of a statutory framework. The War Powers Resolution was ‘necessary and
proper,’ proponents argued, in light of the American experience in Vietnam
and Cambodia.”); Transcript of Testimony by Legal Adviser Harold Hongju
Koh at 12, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (2011) (making a
similar point about the Vietnam War) [hereinafter Koh Statement].
44. BAKER, supra note 17, at 188.
45. Koh, supra note 43, at 1020.
46. John W. Rolph, The Decline and Fall of the War Powers Resolution:
Waging War Under the Constitution After Desert Storm, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 85,
85–86 (1992).
47. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 17, at 187–88; Rolph, supra note 46, at
89.
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However, even if the WPR is constitutional, it does not appear
to include a real enforcement mechanism. As Baker points out,
for a claim to be brought that a President violated the WPR, a
member of Congress would have to obtain standing to sue, and
this “is unlikely to happen, as a matter of substance or
process.”48 Even if this barrier were surmounted, it remains
uncertain whether a court would be willing to address the
underlying merits of such a claim.49
Another factor disfavoring the WPR is the changing nature
of warfare in the forty-five years since its passage. War is
becoming less likely to be carried out by large armies on
battlefields50 and more likely to be fought through new
technologies, such as drones, or cyber attack. The rules set out
by the WPR do not seem well-suited for these forms of modern
warfare. What will count as “hostilities,” in situations where
“war” is fought by remote control or by computers, and not by
soldiers or sailors? As Professor Eric Jensen explains, “[m]any
of these advancing technologies will be so qualitatively different
from current means and methods of warfare that they will
undercut the fundamental understanding of the WPR and
Congress’s intent to regulate the use of military force by the
President.”51 He also observes that President Obama argued
that the WPR was not triggered by his actions in Libya precisely
because they did not involve “boots on the ground.” 52 Jensen’s
proposed solution is that the WPR be amended to make clear
that “boots on the ground” and “hostilities” are not required to
trigger the WPR’s provisions.53
Additionally, many uses of these advanced technologies may
well start and be completed too quickly for the timetable the
48. BAKER, supra note 17, at 191.
49. See id. at 192.
50. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Future War and the War Powers Resolution,
29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 503 (2015) (describing the WPR as having been
“written in an era where the means and methods of armed conflict were
centered on humans interacting on a geographically limited battlefield” and
noting that while this may continue to be the case for many countries,
“technologically advanced nations such as the United States are developing
and will continue to develop new weapons that will not require human
interaction in combat to be effective”).
51. See id. at 504.
52. See id. at 529–30 (internal citations omitted).
53. See id. at 552–55.
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WPR establishes.54 Because of this, even if one were to accept
the sixty-day clock, it is not clear how much of a limitation it
really imposes. If there are going to be significant limits on the
president’s war-making powers, they are likely to be the same
ones that have always existed: popular opinion, namely how
willing the public is to support a president’s decision to go to war
or even engage in more limited actions, and Congress’
appropriations and investigative powers.
The Expansive, Pro-Executive View
In stark contrast to the proponents of the restrictive view
are those who see the president’s authority to enter the United
States into military conflict as relatively unbounded. These
scholars argue that the declare war clause, rather than serving
as a grant of permission from Congress to the president to
engage in hostilities, was instead merely intended to give
Congress the power to declare that a state of war did, in fact,
exist—perhaps in response to actions already taken by the
president or by a hostile power. John Yoo, one of the leading
advocates of this viewpoint, writes that “[a]ccording to the
international law authorities of the time [of the founding], a
declaration of war played the technical function of providing
notice to the enemy nation that hostilities were to begin, due to
some injury suffered.”55 Eugene Rostow further explains that:
With regard to the actual employment of the
armed forces, it is apparent that the term “declare
war” in the Constitution referred to the
classifications of the law of nations, which makes
a sharp distinction between the law of war and the
54. See, e.g., Stephen Dycus, Cybersecurity Symposium: National
Leadership, Individual Responsibility: Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 155, 162 (2010) (“The War Powers Resolution, for
example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm’s way, rather than
with clicking a computer mouse to launch a cyber attack, although the strategic
consequences might be similar. And the WPR’s relatively relaxed timetable for
executive notice and legislative response is unrealistic for war on a digital
battlefield”).
55. John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers
Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1193 (1999).
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law of peace. The law of nations was an intimate
familiar to the men of the revolutionary
generation in America. So far as international law
is concerned, nations were then, and are now, free
to use force in time of peace by way of self-help
against acts or policies of other nations which they
deem contrary to international law, and which
have remained unredressed after a demand for
amends.56
In a review of Ely’s book, Philip Bobbitt maintains that “a
declaration of war only comes after war has commenced”57 and
that, therefore, “such declarations cannot be conditions
precedent to the making of war.”58 To the extent that Congress
could assert its own authority in the realm of war making, it
would be through use of its appropriations powers.59 As Rostow
noted in 1986, American forces up to that point had been used
in international conflicts over 200 times, but the United States
had only declared war five times.60 Similarly, in a speech
criticizing the WPR (a natural focus for modern commentary on
this debate), Robert Bork also pointed to the long history of
presidential use of force, even in the absence of a declaration of
war, and asserted that “[t]he need for Presidents to have that
power, particularly in the modern age, should be obvious to
almost anyone.”61
As for Yoo, he contends that rather than relying on the
views of the participants at the Philadelphia convention who
56. Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act,
50 TEX. L. REV. 833, 850–51 (1972).
57. Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 1364, 1376 (1994).
58. Id.
59. See Yoo, supra note 55, at 1179; see also Robert H. Bork, Erosion of
the President’s Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH U. L. Q. 693, 700 (1990). Of
course, at the time of the founding, the United States did not have a standing
army, which likely gave Congress’ appropriations power even more bite than
it has now.
60. See Eugene V. Rostow, “Once More Unto the Breach:” The War Powers
Resolution Revisited, 21 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1986); see also Yoo, supra
note 55, at 1170.
61. Bork, supra note 59, at 698.
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wrote the Constitution, we should look to the views of those who
ratified it—i.e. the delegates to the state ratifying conventions—
as more authoritative voices on how the language of the declare
war clause was understood: “[t]he action of ratification by
popularly elected conventions selected specifically for the
purpose gave the Constitution its political legitimacy.
Therefore, what those who ratified the Constitution believed the
meaning of the text to be is determinative for originalist
purposes, rather than the intentions of those who drafted the
document.”62 This takes some of the steam out of the other side’s
reliance on statements from the likes of Madison, Hamilton,
Wilson, and Mason. Madison himself appeared to take this
position, declaring in Congress that “[i]f we were to look,
therefore, for the meaning of the [Constitution] beyond the face
of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General
Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions,
which accepted and ratified the Constitution.”63
The states were a bit haphazard when it came to preserving
records of their ratifying conventions, so access to the
deliberations varies. Gregory Maggs explains that “some states
engaged in lengthy debates and kept excellent records, while
other states considered the question of ratification only briefly
and kept almost no records.”64 Only four states—Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York—had extensive
records of their debates, while five others—Delaware, New
Jersey, Georgia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island—have none
at all.65 Yoo examines some of the debates from the Virginia
convention and alleges that they give us a representative sample
of the overall scene. This is because of Virginia’s geographical
62. Yoo, supra note 55, at 1173; see also Bobbitt, supra note 57, at 1375
(likewise arguing for looking to the views of those who ratified the
Constitution, rather than those who wrote it, for understanding its meaning).
Of course, many of the Constitution’s writers in Philadelphia also participated
in their states’ ratifying conventions. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide
to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original
Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 481–84 (2009)
(discussing statements made by Founders at state ratifying conventions as
bases of Constitution’s meaning).
63. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796); see also Maggs, supra note 62, at 458–
59.
64. Maggs, supra note 62, at 460.
65. See id. at 481.
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and political importance,66 and because the debate in its
convention was widespread and contentious.67 Yoo concludes
that the views expressed in Virginia’s ratifying convention
“approximated the views of the median Framer.”68 The four
“extensive” states were also four of the five largest states, so it
is not entirely clear that the views of delegates from these states
can speak for those from the other nine.69 Similarly, it may not
be safe to assume that states where the vote was close, such as
New York (three vote margin), Virginia (ten), and Rhode Island
(two), viewed things the same as the three states where the vote
was unanimous: Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia. Of course,
there may well have been significant differences between the
small states and the large, as well as regional variances. Maggs
also points out that, even where we have extensive records, these
accounts may not be entirely accurate because of limited
technology and bias on the part of the reporters themselves.70
Indeed, a page after his statement extolling the state ratifying
conventions as a source of constitutional meaning, Madison
hastened to add that such records likely contained errors and
misconceptions.71
66. See Yoo, supra note 55, at 1203.
67. See id.
68. Id. Chris DeRose asserts that what really made the difference in
Virginia’s ratification of the Constitution was not some acceptance of a
particular viewpoint or reading of the document. Rather, many delegates
realized that whatever reservations they might have, given how many states
had already ratified prior to the opening of Virginia’s convention (eight, or one
short of the number required for ratification), the fledgling country’s then
largest state risked being left out in the cold if it rejected the document. See
CHRIS DEROSE, FOUNDING RIVALS, MADISON VS. MONROE: THE BILL OF RIGHTS
AND THE ELECTION THAT SAVED A NATION 171–72 (2011). Though, as it turns
out, New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify, beating Virginia by two
days; this fact was not yet known by the Virginia delegates at the time they
voted to ratify. See id. at 198–99. Maggs also cautions against relying too
heavily on the records of the state ratification debates, writing that “anyone
citing the records of the state ratifying conventions should recognize that these
records often do not provide perfect proof of the original meaning of the
Constitution. On the contrary, various significant grounds may exist for
impeaching claims about the original meaning based on these records.” Maggs,
supra note 62, at 486.
69. See Maggs, supra note 62, at 491.
70. See id. at 488–89.
71. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 777 (1796) (remarks of James Madison); see also
Maggs, supra note 62, at 488.
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As for the debates Maggs considered, Yoo concedes that
there was great concern among Antifederalists about
presidential power in the newly proposed system. But
Federalists (including Madison himself) responded to those
concerns not by arguing that the President lacked the power to
initiate armed conflict without congressional assent, but rather
by claiming that Congress would control presidential war
making ambitions through the power of the purse.72 If the views
of Ely, Fisher, and others were correct, Federalists would surely
have eased Antifederalist fears by claiming that the president
could not take the country to war unilaterally.73 Furthermore,
Yoo observes that Article II of the Constitution could have been
written as “the [president] shall have no power to commence
war, or conclude peace, . . . without legislative approval.”74
Yoo also argues that his position is supported by the history
of state constitution writing in the period leading up to the
Constitutional Convention.
Prior to the revolution, the
American colonies were governed by royal charters. These
charters gave strong authority to the colonial governor,
including powers over the “raising and deployment of the
military.”75 To the extent that colonial legislatures tried to
restrict such powers, it was through appropriations.76 When the
colonies became states and wrote new constitutions, there was a
reaction against this strong executive power. The limitations on
executive power in the new states took a multitude of forms; in
many states, the decision was made to do away with a single,
unitary executive.77
Far from supporting a restrictive view of executive war
making authority, Yoo makes the case that the states discovered
these severe restrictions on executive power to be unworkable.
72. See Yoo, supra note 55, at 1207. In a subsequent article co-authored
with Jide Nzelibe, Yoo and Nzelibe assert that Congress has used this power
effectively on occasion. See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and
Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2521 (2006).
73. See Yoo, supra note 55, at 1207.
74. Id. at 1200–01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 219 (1996).
76. See id. at 220–21.
77. See id. at 222–23 (noting that Pennsylvania, for example, replaced its
governor with a twelve-person executive council).
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Thus, by the time of the Constitutional Convention (and its
aftermath), the pendulum had swung back in the direction of
greater executive power. Yoo notes that a draft of the Virginia
Constitution authored by Jefferson which greatly restricted
executive authority (including war making powers) was rejected,
not only in Virginia, but also in the approaches taken by other
states.78 Instead, the new state constitutions favored an
approach closer to (if not exactly the same as) that used by
England, which did not place such severe restrictions on
executive authority to commence hostilities.79 Though, as Yoo
mentions, some states did place limits on a governor’s power to
call out the militia,80 he claims that this actually supports his
argument about the federal Constitution because it indicates
that constitution writers thought it necessary to explicitly
indicate where the executive’s war making powers were limited,
yet no such similar limitation appears in the federal
Constitution81—assuming, that is, one first accepts his reading
of what the declare war clause actually means.
Rostow takes a similar line, asserting that the declare war
clause “does not mean that the national force can only be used if
Congress has first approved the President’s action through a
declaration of war.”82 He further charges that those who
advocate the restrictive view have a naïve picture of how
international affairs truly operate, writing that they “suppose
that if the United States were weak, pacifist, and unarmed, the
predators of the jungle would fully respect its rights under
international law.”83 Sounding a somewhat related theme,
Bobbitt argues that the claims of the restrictive views’ advocates
78. See id. at 224–25 (stating that “[a]lthough a dead end, Jefferson’s
scheme was widely circulated, and it provided an example of how the Framers
could have created a legislature-first approach to war—if they had chosen to
do so”).
79. See id. at 225–26.
80. See id. at 227 (referring to Delaware’s constitution as an example).
81. See Yoo, supra note 75 at 227 (stating “if the Framers of the federal
Constitution had wanted the President to consult with either the legislature
or within the executive before embarking on a military venture, they easily
could have borrowed from these state provisions and required the President to
consult with the Senate (as some in the Constitutional Convention proposed)
or some other body”).
82. Rostow, supra note 60, at 16.
83. Id. at 18.
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prove too much: they proclaim that the change in language in
early drafts of the Constitution from giving Congress the power
to “make” war to “declare” war meant that Congress would not
be responsible for the conduct of military action, but its
permission would be required in order to take the country into
armed conflict.84 If so, Bobbitt argues, then there is no room left
for a stance that the President can, for example, respond to a
sudden attack, even in the absence of congressional
authorization—a position no one is willing to take.85 In addition
to agreeing with Yoo’s claims about the true meaning of
“declaring war” under international law,86 Rostow turns the
democratic accountability argument made by proponents of the
restrictive view on its head. Members of Congress, he argues,
would actually prefer that the responsibility for putting
American lives at risk lie exclusively with the President.87
Aside from these claims about textual meaning and original
intent, but related to Rostow’s point about how international
affairs are actually conducted is an argument that the President,
because of informational advantages that he has due to the vast
resources at his disposal, and because he is a single actor, is
simply in a better position than Congress to make decisions
about war making. This is especially so when those conclusions
need to be reached with dispatch. Professor David Moore writes
that “[a]s has been recognized since the Founding, the President,
in comparison to Congress, is better able to act quickly,
uniformly, with secrecy, and based on information gathered from
far-flung diplomatic and military agents.”88 Or, as Robert
84. See Bobbitt, supra note 57, at 1376.
85. See id.
86. See Rostow, supra note 60, at 16.
87. Id.; see also ELY, supra note 5, at 49 (quoting former Senator Thomas
Eagleton testifying in a Senate hearing that he had concluded “Congress didn’t
really want to have its fingerprints on sensitive matters pertaining to putting
our Armed Forces into hostilities . . . . [Instead,] Congress preferred the right
of retrospective criticism” (internal citation omitted)); Jensen, supra note 50,
at 502 (describing struggle over war powers as one “characterized by what
seems to be an ever-increasing adventurism by the President and an everdecreasing willingness to exert power by the Congress”); Rolph, supra note 46,
at 90 (stating “Congress has been reluctant to assert itself on war powers
issues”).
88. David H. Moore, Taking Cues from Congress: Judicial Review,
Congressional Authorization, and the Expansion of Presidential Power, 90
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Bejesky puts it, “[i]n military affairs, members of Congress
cannot expeditiously garner the level of information about a
potential or existing hostility that the Executive can attain.”89
The Supreme Court has accepted the logic of this argument
as well. In a 1965 decision challenging the Secretary of State’s
refusal to validate passports for travel to Cuba, the Court wrote:
[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature
of contemporary international relations, and the
fact that the Executive is immediately privy to
information which cannot be swiftly presented to,
evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature,
Congress—in giving the Executive authority over
matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint
with a brush broader than that it customarily
wields in domestic areas.90
While many of the arguments discussed so far call upon
original intent to bolster their claims, the informational
argument has a decidedly non-originalist bent to it. Many have
suggested that part of the reason for the president’s advantages
here is the increasing complexity of world affairs and the
centrality of the United States in those undertakings, things
that were not true and were likely not foreseen at the time of the
founding.91

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1033–34 (2015).
89. Bejesky, supra note 16, at 51.
90. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
91. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 444-45 (2012) (stating
“[t]he complexities of the modern economy and administrative state, along with
the heightened role of the United States in foreign affairs, have necessitated
broad delegations of authority to the executive branch”); Oona A. Hathaway,
Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE
L.J. 140, 267 (2009) (noting “[t]he United States, which was at the time of its
creation a small and relatively insignificant entity in world politics, was by the
1940s a dominant economic, military, and political force”). Hathaway also
points out that the dramatic increase in foreign aid by the United States in the
aftermath of World War II increased presidential authority in the realm of
international affairs relative to that of Congress. See id. at 185.
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The Middle Ground
In between the pro-executive and pro-Congress viewpoints
exists something of a compromise approach. These analyses,
coming largely from Obama and Clinton administration officials,
have taken the position that, for limited military operations, a
president can move forward on his own. In other words, the
president’s authority to act on military matters is not without
restrictions, but Congress’ input is only required for actions that
reach a certain threshold of military involvement.
In justifying President Obama’s decision to intervene in
2011 in Libya without seeking prior congressional authorization,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Caroline Krass,
writing on behalf of the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), first
explained the limited nature of the planned Libya operation:
America would be acting in concert with allies and ground forces
would not be used at all or, at most, as part of search and rescue
operations, and, therefore, the risk of substantial casualties was
low.92 As a result, the President had not been required to seek
congressional authorization.93 The Krass memo also referenced
prior OLC memos which had concluded that the President could
take military action to “protect[] important national interests”
without prior input from Congress.94
Picking up on this theme, then-State Department Legal
Adviser Harold Koh argued that American engagement in Libya
did not rise to the level of “hostilities,”95 and, therefore, even if
one accepted the authority of the WPR, it was not implicated by
our actions in Libya.96 Though, as Koh also pointed out, in spite
of the claim that the WPR was not triggered by the
92. See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, U.S. Principal Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., Authority to Use
Military
Force
in
Libya
6
(Apr.
1,
2011),
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/libya.pdf.
93. See id.
94. Id. (internal citation omitted).
95. See Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 4; 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2012)
(stating the WPR is triggered by “the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use
of such forces in hostilities or in such situations”).
96. See Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 4.
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Administration’s activities in Libya, President Obama in fact
followed the WPR’s requirement to notify Congress within fortyeight hours of the beginning of the intervention.97 Nevertheless,
Koh asserted that “hostilities” was an “ambiguous standard”98
and noted that, not only was it not defined in the WPR itself, but
it had also never been fleshed out by any reviewing court or in
subsequent legislation.99
Koh further argued that the vagueness was intentional to
allow some flexibility for presidential action.100 As a result, what
“constitutes ‘hostilities’ . . . has been determined more by
interbranch practice than by a narrow parsing of dictionary
definitions.”101 However, quoting former Executive Branch
officials, it has been seen as existing when American forces are
actively exchanging fire with the armed forces of other
countries.102 By contrast, “hostilities” should not be said to exist
when the threat to U.S. forces is low.103 According to these
standards, American military activities in Libya did not cross
the “hostilities” threshold.104
Similarly, in 1994, Walter Dellinger, then the Assistant
Attorney General for OLC, authored an opinion on behalf of his
office arguing that American military activities in Haiti did not
constitute war in the constitutional sense.105 Thus, even for
proponents of the restrictive view, there was no constitutional
violation. This was because of the limited nature of the
military’s involvement, the low risk of escalation, and because
the intervention was with the full approval of the Haitian
government itself106 —something which of course was not true
in the case of American intervention in Libya.
The arguments put forth here essentially try to avoid the
debate between the proponents of the restrictive and pro97. See § 1543(a)(3); see also Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 3.
98. Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 4.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 4–5.
101. Id. at 5.
102. See id. at 6.
103. See id. at 7.
104. See Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 12.
105. See Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 173, 173 (1994).
106. See id.
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executive positions. Instead of quarreling about what the literal
meaning of “declaring” war is and what this establishes with
regard to the relative power of the executive and legislative
branches, Krass, Koh, and Dellinger try to carve out a use of
military force that is minimal enough so as not to rise to the level
of “war,” or “hostilities,” resulting in the avoidance of
constitutional and statutory questions about the correct
understanding of the declare war clause and the meaning and
constitutionality of the WPR. Koh asserts that Congress has
“largely acquiesced in this interpretation.”107 Though, as he also
points out, the Clinton Administration essentially ignored this
distinction when it came to the Kosovo bombing campaign and
the sixty-day deadline,108 principally because officials came to
the conclusion that, even though what was occurring at the
sixty-day mark constituted hostilities, it would have been
disastrous to stop at that point and wait for congressional
assent.109
While it is fair to characterize the position of Krass,
Dellinger, and Koh as between the poles represented by the
restrictive and pro-executive viewpoints, it is equally fair to note
that it is a somewhat pro-executive position in its own right.
This stance allows the executive branch to take the initiative in
determining what level of military activity does and does not
constitute “hostilities.” Thus, the president will still have
considerable power to commence military engagements without
congressional sanction. The pro-executive bent of this position
should not be surprising given that the statements of the
position have come from individuals who were acting in their
capacities as executive branch attorneys.110

107. Koh, supra note 43, at 978.
108. See id. at 978–79.
109. See id. at 979.
110. Though beyond the scope of this article, the question of whether the
primary obligation of lawyers in OLC or elsewhere in the Executive Branch
should be to what they truly believe the state of the law is, or whether they
should act as advocates for their client (especially when that client is the
President), even if it means promoting a less convincing position, is an
important one. See, e.g., Robert Bauer, The National Security Lawyer, in
Crisis: When the “Best View” of the Law May Not Be the Best View, 31 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 175 (2018).

23

ARTICLE 2_SHERMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

620

8/23/2019 6:29 PM

Vol. 39.2

PACE LAW REVIEW
Humanitarian Intervention

When the United Nations was created, its primary (if not
only) purpose was to prevent, or at least reduce, armed conflict
between its member states. The preamble to the U.N. Charter
states that one of the organization’s goals would be “to maintain
international peace and security.”111 In the new international
body’s view, the main way to attain this goal would be to
eliminate armed interstate conflict. Thus, Article 2(4) of the
Charter states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”112 Additionally, Article 2(3) directs member states to
“settle their international disputes by peaceful means.”113
It should not be surprising that the U.N. started with such
a strong focus on interstate armed conflict. It was, of course,
founded in the ashes of the most destructive war the world had
ever seen and not long after the end of the second most lethal.
As if to leave no doubt, the Charter’s preamble references the
two world wars right from the start.114 The choice of solution to
prevent a repeat of these two catastrophes was a focus on the
sovereignty of nation states. It was thought that if such
sovereignty were to be protected, then it would greatly reduce,
perhaps even eliminate, large-scale armed conflict. As MarianoFlorentino Cuellar writes:
Directly after the war, Americans and their allies
emphasized the importance of creating a collective
security arrangement to promote international
security by protecting sovereign nations against
aggressive war. I call this approach ‘sovereigntycentered collective security.’ Its overt, organizing
principle was a deep reverence for an expansive
concept of national territorial sovereignty.115
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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This focus on the sovereignty of nation-states was hardly a
radical choice in 1945. David Scheffer observes that:
Sovereignty is the central pillar of international
law. The very purpose of the law of nations, as
international law was formerly described, was to
create legal safeguards for the preservation of the
sovereign power vested in the governments of
distinct territorial units called nation-states. For
centuries, sovereignty identified the nation-state
as the legitimate international actor entitled to
the protection of international law.116
This is a concept that dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia
in 1648.117 Though this is not to say that there had been no
attempts in international lawmaking to protect individuals as
individuals and not just as members of nation states. Multiple
Geneva and Hague Conventions, all passed before the creation
of the U.N., addressed the rights of individuals, especially in
times of armed conflict.118
The flip side of the emphasis on the inviolability of
international boundaries was a commitment from the U.N. to
stay out of the internal affairs of its member states. Thus,
Article 2(7) of the Charter states that “[n]othing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
Collective Security, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 211, 215 (2004).
116. David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 259–60 (1992).
117. See, e.g., RICHARD HAASS, A WORLD IN DISARRAY: AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 22–24 (2017); T. Modibo Ocran, The
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping, 25
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (explaining “[i]n modern history, the
principle of sovereignty was established under the Treaty of Westphalia of
1648, which brought an end to the Thirty-Year War”).
118. See generally Amanda Alexander, A Short History of International
Humanitarian Law, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 109 (2015) (discussing conventions); see
also Karina Michael Waller, Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts and the Rise of
International Law: How the Rise of Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts Has Rendered
International Human Rights Laws Ineffective, Especially Regarding Sex-Based
Crimes, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 621, 624–25 (2001) (discussing
Geneva and Hague conventions).
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of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters
to settlement under the present Charter.”119 As Ocran writes,
“[t]he principle of noninterference in the affairs of another state
is viewed as a corollary of the more basic principle of
sovereignty.”120
The hands-off approach to domestic issues does have a
limitation: it does not preclude “the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.”121 However, an examination of
Chapter VII shows that it is concerned with taking action
against states which violate the sovereignty of other states, not
against states that violate the rights of their own people. Most
importantly, Article 51’s self-defense provision applies in
situations in which a member-state has suffered an armed
attack.122 There is no discussion of the right of self-defense by,
for example, a minority group in a member-state that is being
attacked by its own government, much less the right of another
member-state to intervene on behalf of that minority group. So,
while the Security Council invoked Chapter VII on behalf of
South Korea, the use of armed force against North Korea was
triggered by its invasion of the South, not because of any
violation of the rights of North Koreans. The first Security
Council Resolution on the Korean conflict, Number 82, began by
noting that the Republic of Korea was a “lawfully established
government.”123 All North Korea was expected to do was retreat
to the 38th Parallel;124 there wasn’t any discussion concerning the
North Korean government’s treatment of its nationals.
However, in the years since 1945, support for humanitarian
intervention, the idea that there is a need in some circumstances
to intercede in the internal affairs of states to prevent or end
human rights catastrophes, has gathered steam—Article 2(7)
notwithstanding.125 While there may not be one universally
119. U.N. Charter ch. 1, art. 2, ¶ 7.
120. Ocran, supra note 117, at 3.
121. Id. (quoting Richard B. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human
Rights, 15 MCGILL L.J. 205, 208–09 (1969)).
122. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
123. S.C. Res. 82, pmbl. (June 25, 1950).
124. See id. at ¶ 1.
125. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of Human Rights Under
International Law: Will the U.N. Human Rights Council and the Emerging
New Norm “Responsibility to Protect” Make a Difference?, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L &
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accepted definition of the term, it has been characterized as “the
justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the
inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and
persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the
sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.”126
Similarly, Scheffer affirms that:
The classical definition of ‘humanitarian
intervention’ is limited to those instances in which
a nation unilaterally uses military force to
intervene in the territory of another state for the
purpose of protecting a sizable group of
indigenous people from life-threatening or
otherwise unconscionable infractions of their
human rights that the national government
inflicts or in which it acquiesces.127
However defined, as Harold Koh points out, the concept can
be found as far back as in the writings of seventeenth-century
international law scholar Hugo Grotius.128 In Volume 2 of De
Jure Ac Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace), Grotius considers
“[w]hether we have a just Cause for War with another Prince, in
order to relieve his Subjects from their Oppression under
him.”129 While he acknowledges that “since the Institution of
Civil Societies, the Governors of every State have acquired some
peculiar Right over their . . . Subjects,”130 he concludes that “if
the Injustice be visible, as if a Busiris, a Phalaris, or a Thracian
Diomedes exercise such Tyrannies over Subjects, as no good Man
living can approve of, the Right of human Society shall not be

POL’Y 353, 355 (2007) (stating”[t]he international human rights movement is
of relatively recent origin. However, in a short time it has blossomed into a
developed body of international human rights law, with the establishment of
necessary institutions for its implementation and enforcement”).
126. ELLERY STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 349, 352
(1931); see also Ocran, supra note 117, at 8.
127. Scheffer, supra note 116, at 264.
128. See Koh, supra note 43, at 976 n.10.
129. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1159 (Richard Tuck
ed., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2005).
130. Id.
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therefore excluded.”131
Michael Reisman argues that one of the first seeds of
contemporary support for humanitarian intervention was prodemocracy language in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”).132 The UDHR was written shortly after the
U.N. Charter and, therefore, at a time when state sovereignty
was still the rule.133 However, it included language establishing
popular will expressed through regular, free elections as the
basis for governmental legitimacy.134 As Reisman notes, because
it has become feasible to measure a state’s commitment to free
elections, it is now possible to call to account states that fail to
meet this standard, even at the cost of impinging on their
sovereignty.135 It also means that already-existing states have
the means to deny recognition to a group that seizes power
through a coup or revolution, instead of by means of popular
support.136 Thus, we have now reached the stage where Reisman
can say that “no serious scholar still supports the contention that
internal human rights are ‘essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state’ and hence insulated from international
law.”137
Apart from the issue of a particular government’s
democratic legitimacy is the question whether an
internationally-recognized government acts humanely toward
its own people. Furthermore, if its people are being treated
poorly and the government is in serious violation of
international human rights treaties, what corrective action, if
any, may be taken in response?
In her book, “A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of
Genocide, Samantha Power details the efforts of Raphael

131. Id. at 1161.
132. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 867–68 (1990).
133. See id. at 867.
134. See id. at 867–68.
135. See id. at 868.
136. See id. at 870.
137. Id. at 869; see also Koh, supra note 43, at 1004 (stating “I believe
that international law has evolved sufficiently to permit morally legitimate
action to prevent atrocities by responding, for example, to the deliberate use of
chemical weapons”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2

28

ARTICLE 2_SHERMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS

8/23/2019 6:29 PM

625

Lemkin, who barely escaped Poland ahead of the Nazi army138
and lost dozens of family members to the Holocaust,139 to create
and define the term genocide.140 As Power informs her readers,
Lemkin was a critic of the Nuremberg trials because the Court
only sought to punish crimes that occurred after the Nazis had
crossed international borders, waging “aggressive war.”141 Thus,
“[b]y inference, if the Nazis had exterminated the entire German
Jewish population but never invaded Poland, they would not
have been liable at Nuremberg.”142 Lemkin wanted something
that would encompass actions taken by a government against its
own nationals.143 Though at first he struggled to win support for
his ideas,144 he was instrumental in the General Assembly’s
1948 vote to establish the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.145
Because the
Convention defined genocide as, inter alia, killing members of “a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group,”146 there was no
requirement of interstate conflict to invoke the Convention’s
prohibitions.
Thus, despite the traditional notions of
sovereignty expressed in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter, there were at least some indications from early in the
U.N.’s history that sovereignty might not be completely
inviolable.
Still, humanitarian intervention has always been a
troubling concept for many people, not only because of its
challenge to traditional notions of state sovereignty, but also due
to fears that making such actions acceptable would have
significant pernicious effects and encourage states to pursue all
sorts of goals while claiming to be intervening on humanitarian
grounds.147
Edward Luttwak makes a slightly different
138. See SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL:” AMERICA AND THE
AGE OF GENOCIDE 23–26 (2002).
139. See id. at 49.
140. See id. at 31–60.
141. Id. at 49.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 51.
144. See POWER, supra note 138, at 50.
145. See id. at 59–60.
146. G.A. Res. 260 art. II, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948).
147. See Scheffer, supra note 116, at 258 (noting that opponents of
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argument, claiming that peacekeeping operations cause more
long-term harm than good because it is better to let the
belligerents wear themselves out.148
Regardless, even if everyone were to agree on the
acceptability of humanitarian intervention, it is one thing to
pass a treaty banning genocide and quite another to get memberstates to actively put it into effect. Power argues that, in order
for the ban to have been effective, it required leadership from
the United States.149 However, the U.S. did not even ratify the
treaty until 1988, much less attempt to lead the world in
enforcing its prohibitions.150
Unfortunately, the second half of the twentieth century saw
more than its share of mass killings, providing plenty of
opportunities for the world to decide whether, and under what
conditions, humanitarian intervention might be acceptable or
even a necessity. As Power highlights, very little was done to
respond to mass killings in Cambodia and Rwanda, and not
nearly enough in the former Yugoslavia.151 Even as this is being
written, humanitarian disasters are occurring in Syria and
Burma, among other places.
Nevertheless, even if relatively little action has been taken
in response to these events, their occurrences have increased
discussion of and support for at least the concept of
humanitarian intervention, despite the fact that such
interventions would seem to violate Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the
U.N. Charter. In decrying the lack of response to various human
rights crises, Ved Nanda lays the blame squarely on these
provisions: “the underlying cause remains the current statecentered international system, under which each state jealously
guards its sovereignty and often invokes the doctrine of non-

humanitarian intervention argued that “to invoke a ‘principle’ of humanitarian
intervention would open a Pandora’s Box of military interventions that would
disrupt the nation-state system and permit the forcible pursuit of political,
economic, and security objectives far removed from alleged humanitarian
concerns”).
148. See Edward N. Luttwak, Give War a Chance, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 36,
37–38 (1999); see also Ocran, supra note 117, at 3 (discussing Luttwak).
149. See POWER, supra note 138, at 61.
150. See id. at 161–69.
151. See generally id. at 87–155, 247–475.
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intervention in its internal affairs.”152 Still, as he also observes,
the situation is changing:
The period since 1976 has witnessed great
strides in the development of international
human rights law as an impressive body of norms,
institutions, and procedures has transformed the
subject. Regional human rights machinery exists
in Europe, the Americas, and Africa, and is in the
formative
stage
in
Southeast
Asia,
complementing the U.N. machinery created to
promote and protect human rights and to provide
effective remedies. Customary international law
has also played a significant role in this process.
It would have been inconceivable sixty years
ago to envisage the development and progress of
international human rights law we see today. To
illustrate, numerous international agreements
have created a wide range of international human
rights norms, treaty bodies have been established
to monitor implementation by member states of
their treaty obligations, and an ever-growing body
of soft law—emerging international human rights
guidelines, principles, and norms—has developed.
All these developments are of great significance
for every student of international human rights
law.153
Similarly, Scheffer shines a light on a significant evolution
in international attitudes during the latter half of the twentieth
century, describing a “new standard of intolerance for human
misery and human atrocities.”154 As a result, “[d]espite the
emphatic character of [Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter], its
terminology has been interpreted and qualified.”155 Scheffer
quotes a 1991 speech by then U.N. Secretary-General Javier

152.
153.
154.
155.

Nanda, supra note 125, at 354.
Id. at 356.
Scheffer, supra note 116, at 259.
Id. at 261.
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Perez de Cuellar in which the Secretary-General, while not
willing to endorse any sort of open-ended principle of
humanitarian intervention, did say that “[i]t is now increasingly
felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential
domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective
barrier behind which human rights could be massively or
systematically violated with impunity.”156
When looking for concrete examples of this change in
attitude translating into action, the NATO intervention in the
former Yugoslavia seems to have marked an important moment
in the willingness of U.N. member-states to engage in military
action in the name of humanitarian interests—Articles 2(4) and
2(7) of the Charter notwithstanding.157 The intervenors had to
claim humanitarian justifications in order to defend their
“restrictive” view of the notion of state sovereignty.158 As Rohini
Sen points out, the trend toward taking action on humanitarian
grounds has increased post-Yugoslavia.159
Contributing to this trend is the rise in importance of NGOs
and civil society groups. Not only is state sovereignty no longer
inviolable, but states are no longer the only significant actors on
the world stage. While NGOs played advisory roles in the U.N.’s
founding, such groups were initially given no formal role in the
organization’s governing structure.160 Additionally, while NGOs
and other groups still lack the formal authority and position of
156. Id. at 262 (internal citation omitted).
157. See Rohini Sen, Use of Force and the ‘Humanitarian’ Face of
Intervention in the 21st Century, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 457, 459 (2014) (writing that
NATO’s actions “invigorated the notion of unilateralism” and that “[f]or the
first time since the establishment of the United Nations’ collective security
system, a group of states expressly defended a breach of state sovereignty
through unilateral use of force, predominantly on humanitarian grounds”).
158. See id. at 460.
159. See id.; see also Koh, supra note 43, at 1007. (“Since Kosovo . . .
within the international legal order, the multilateral use of force for
humanitarian ends is perceived as far more legitimate than it was only a few
decades ago” (internal citation omitted)). As Sen also discusses, the Pandora’s
Box fears that Scheffer brings up in his article have also materialized: Russia
has justified its annexation of Crimea on humanitarian grounds, claiming
human rights violations against ethnic Russians in the area. See supra note
148 and accompanying text; see also Sen, supra note 157, at 461; see infra notes
189–94 and accompanying text for further discussion.
160. See David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 595, 609 (2010).
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sovereign states, “[t]he emergence of twenty-first century
institutions that are adopting multi-stakeholder models of
governance and expanding the role of civil society creates an
opening for new ways of thinking about the governance of
international institutions.”161 As a result, “[c]ivil society groups
are among a range of non-state actors that are now centrally
involved in the formal governance of diverse institutions and are
transforming the nature of the debate around many key global
challenges.”162 These institutions provide yet another source of
authority beyond the nation-state.
The Responsibility to Protect
A more recent development in humanitarian-intervention
thinking comes in the form of the so-called “Responsibility to
Protect,” or R2P. Whereas humanitarian intervention, as first
understood, was thought to give countries a means to intervene
in the internal affairs of fellow sovereign states, R2P takes this
a step further, putting forth the notion that countries may in fact
have an affirmative obligation or responsibility to intervene in
the face of human rights crises outside their own borders.
R2P was first formalized and explained in a 2001 report of
the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (“ICISS”), which was created by the Canadian
government. The ICISS document defined the issue as follows:
“the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take
coercive – and in particular military – action, against another
state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other
state.”163 A report from the 2005 World Summit led to a General
Assembly resolution stating that:
[W]e are prepared to take collective action, in a
timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter,
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and

161. Id. at 615.
162. Id.
163. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT vii (2001).

AND

STATE
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in
cooperation
with
relevant
regional
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful
means be inadequate and national authorities are
manifestly failing to protect their populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.164
As Richard Haass explains, “what made R2P even more
significant was an associated notion, namely that the
‘international community’ also had the responsibility to help to
protect populations . . . including through the use of military
force . . . even if [the affected sovereign] opposed outside
involvement.”165
R2P remains a controversial idea. Milena Sterio writes that
R2P “has experienced several important advancements,” 166
including being specifically referenced in at least two Security
Council Resolutions.167 However, she also observes that it has
164. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139 (Oct. 24, 2005) (stating that this resolution
leaves the ultimate decision in the hands of the Security Council, which some
advocates of greater intervention fear will too often stymie needed action.
Because of this, some R2P proposals have extended to an imposition on a
different, though related, form of sovereignty: proposals to restrict the veto
powers of the 5 permanent members (“P5”) of the Security Council, in
situations deemed humanitarian crises by the Secretary-General); see also
Harvard Law Review, Recent Draft Resolution: International Law—The
Responsibility to Protect—Draft Security Council Resolution Referring Syrian
Conflict to the International Criminal Court Vetoed by Russia and China (13
in Favor, 2 Against).—U.N. Scor, 69th Sess., 7180th Mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.7180 (May 22, 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1062 (2015) (describing the
concept known as the Responsibility Not to Veto, or RN2V).
165. HAASS, supra note 117, at 116; see also Nadia Banteka, Dangerous
Liaisons: The Responsibility to Protect and a Reform of the U.N. Security
Council, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 388 n.18 (2016) (stating “[h]istorically,
R2P had been invented to replace the highly controversial concept of
humanitarian intervention by shifting the terms of the debate from
sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility and from a right to
intervene to a responsibility to protect”).
166. Milena Sterio, Humanitarian Intervention Post-Syria: Legitimate
and Legal?, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 109, 132 (2014).
167. See S.C. Res. 1674 ¶ 4 (“[r]eaffirm[ing] the provisions of paragraphs
138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity”); see also S.C. Res. 1706 pmbl.
(referencing Resolution 1674 as well as the relevant portions of the World
Summit document on R2P); see Sterio, supra note 166, at 132.
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not reached the level of general acceptance necessary for it to be
considered binding, customary law.168
Furthermore, the
General Assembly refused to allocate funds for a newly formed
office on R2P,169 and “member states have not progressed further
than agreeing to continue ‘considering’ this concept.”170 Neomi
Rao argues that “[p]roponents of R2P have failed to identify the
particular duty that State R owes to People V and to provide an
adequate foundation for it.”171 She makes the additional claim
that, wholly apart from the imposition on the sovereignty of the
state that is victimizing its nationals, casting intervention as an
obligation on the part of the potentially intervening state
interferes with that state’s right to choose not to intervene.172
These practical and theoretical criticisms of R2P are hardly
trivial. That said, it remains the case that in little longer than
a half century since World War II, the international community
has shown signs of shifting from the idea of sovereignty being all
but inviolable to the notion that countries might have the
authority to violate the sovereignty of other countries in the
name of humanitarian concerns, to the idea that these countries
not only have the option to intervene, but might well be obligated
to do so—no small amount of movement in a relatively short
period of time.
Humanitarian Intervention and Theories of Presidential
Warmaking Authority
Having looked at some of the main theories on what the
Constitution says about the President’s authority to engage in
military action without first seeking congressional approval, we
can now consider those theories as they apply to humanitarian
intervention, whether in its more traditional version or under
the rubric of R2P.
168. See Sterio, supra note 166, at 133.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 135; see also Neomi Rao, The Choice to Protect: Rethinking
Responsibility for Humanitarian Intervention, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
697, 703 (2013) (stating “[t]he real-world adoption of R2P by states, however,
has been more modest”).
171. Rao, supra note 170, at 726.
172. See id. at 733–34.
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An initial problem is the difficulty in arguing that the
Founders anticipated the concept of humanitarian intervention,
much less how it should be evaluated under the Constitution.
There is nothing to suggest that the attendees at the 1787
Constitutional Convention envisioned a time when the United
States would be a, much less the, dominant world power with
the capacity (and standing army) to intervene at times and
places of its choosing, and in circumstances that did not involve
serious threats to America’s national security. Even if we accept
that the Founders wanted to limit military “adventurism” by the
Commander in Chief, it is not clear that humanitarian
intervention qualifies as the sort of adventurism the Founders
feared.
Are humanitarian interventions different than other
military actions for purposes of the president’s constitutional
authority? One implication of the position taken by the
expansive, pro-executive camp appears to be that, if the
Constitution intends to entrust the president with at least the
initial decision to take America into some form of armed conflict,
then it should not matter whether it is to (a) fend off an
immediate attack; (b) engage in a longer term conflict to protect
vital national security interests; or (c) stave off a humanitarian
disaster.
On the other hand, part of the argument for giving the
president sole authority to make this decision (at least initially)
is because he is in a uniquely strong and well-informed position
to quickly assess the national interest and respond
appropriately. This may not be the case with regard to
humanitarian intervention, where the United States is less
likely to be under any immediate threat and where there will
generally be more time for fuller consideration of what America’s
options are before a decision is made. The genocides in
Cambodia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, for example, did
not happen overnight. While any delays in responding risked
additional lives lost, these were not situations where a choice to
intervene had to be taken at a particular moment, if it was to be
made at all. Thus, the sorts of explanations given to defend a
pro-executive version of war powers may not apply when it
comes to humanitarian intervention.
The president’s
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informational and efficiency advantages are probably not as
important.
Similarly, even if one accepts the R2P notion that countries,
under some circumstances, do not have the choice, but rather an
obligation, to intervene, this does little to change the picture.
The facts that indicate a major humanitarian disaster is
occurring are likely to be available to Congress as well as the
president. Once again, the president’s informational advantage
will not be substantial, not to mention a decision will probably
not need to be made overnight. Plus, until such time as R2P
gains significant authority in international law, there appears
to be little suggestion that there is anything that would
translate R2P into an affirmative, constitutional obligation of
the president to initiate humanitarian interventions.
The discussion of the presidential desire for fame provides
useful insight into the question of presidential war power in the
context of humanitarian intervention. Irrespective of what the
Founders’ intent was with regard to this authority, much less
how this might apply in the context of humanitarian
interventions, if we are concerned about an overly aggressive
executive seeking out lasting fame, then we have less to worry
about when it comes to humanitarian intervention. This is
partly true because public support for these types of actions
tends to be somewhat weak to begin with and will likely
disintegrate at signs of significant costs to the United States.
Public opinion will have an impact on presidential authority
in any kind of military conflict, especially if things go poorly, but
presidents may be on an especially tight leash when it comes to
humanitarian intervention. In a 1996 article, Carolyn Logan
discusses changes in public approval of American intervention
in Somalia in the early 1990s.173 As Logan points out, when the
intervention was initiated in December of 1992 by the (lame
duck) Bush administration, there was an extremely high level of
public backing.174 However, by October of the following year,
especially after the deaths of eighteen American servicemen in
Mogadishu, public support had fallen, leading to the withdrawal
173. See Carolyn J. Logan, U.S. Public Opinion and the Intervention in
Somalia: Lessons for the Future of Military-Humanitarian Interventions, 20
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 155 (1996).
174. See id. at 156.
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of U.S. forces under public pressure.175
One consequence of the seeming failure of the Somalia
mission was the issuance in 1994 by the Clinton Administration
of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (“PDD 25”). This document
set out standards for American involvement in what it described
as “peace operations.”176 According to the Directive:
[T]he United States will vote in the UN Security
Council for multilateral peace operations, or,
where appropriate, take the lead in calling for
them, when member states are prepared to
support the effort with forces and funds; when
the U.S. decides that the operation’s political and
military objectives are clear and feasible; and
when UN involvement represents the best means
to advance U.S. interests.177
An annex to PDD 25 expands a bit on the factors to be
considered in determining whether the U.S. would support a
vote in favor of a “multilateral peace operation.”178 In addition
to deciding whether involvement would advance American
interests, the U.S. would consider whether:
There is a threat to or breach of international
peace and security, often of a regional character,
defined as one or a combination of the following:
− international aggression;
− a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent
action, coupled with violence;
− sudden and unexpected interruption of [an]
established democracy or gross violation of
human rights, coupled with violence or the
threat thereof.179

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2

Id. at 155–56.
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (1994).
Id. at 2.
Id.
See id. at 17.
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Logan asserts that PDD 25 had “provide[d] guidelines that
virtually preclude American involvement in most types of
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.”180 Naval Officer
Glenn Ware writes that “[w]hat PDD 25 has done is
unmistakable. Support or participation will not be forthcoming
from the United States if the peace operation does not advance
vital U.S. interests.”181 The “vital national interests” standard
places a much higher bar than a “just causes” test, which would
seem to allow for American intervention even where significant
national interests could not be articulated.182 The impact of this
change could be seen almost immediately in the American
decision not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide.183 The
impact of public opinion here, as well as a long-term trend of
reduced public support in the U.S. for intervening in
humanitarian crises,184 suggest that American presidents are
constrained, even apart from whether they have the
constitutional power to unilaterally authorize humanitarian
intervention.
Thus, if public opinion is liable to be cool toward
humanitarian intervention, presidents are less likely to engage
in such operations as a means of enhancing their own historical
legacies. Certainly, neither Presidents Bush nor Clinton added
to their fame or historical legacies by means of the Somalia
intervention. As a result, there is less reason to fear a pro180. See Logan, supra note 173, at 155 (stating that it is now known that
PDD-25 was in the works before the Black Hawk Down incident, so the Clinton
administration was likely moving toward a more restrictive policy on
peacemaking even before the loss of the 18 soldiers); see also Flavia Gasbarri,
PDD-25 and the Genocide in Rwanda: Why Not a Task for the United States?,
WILSON CTR. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/pdd-25and-the-genocide-rwanda-why-not-task-for-the-united-states. Whether the
final document would have been different in the absence of this disaster is, of
course, impossible to know for sure.
181. Glenn T. Ware, The Emerging Norm of Humanitarian Intervention
and Presidential Decision Directive 25, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 33 (1997).
182. See id. at 2–3.
183. Id.; see also POWER, supra note 138, at 377–80. Though as Power
also points out, President Clinton came to regret not intervening in Rwanda.
See id. at 386.
184. See Max Fisher, American Isolationism Just Hit a 50-Year High.
Why That Matters., WASH POST (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/news/worldviews/wp/2013/12/04/american-isolationism-just-hit-a-50-year-h
igh-why-that-matters/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e42ef93bafe7.
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executive analysis when it comes to humanitarian interventions,
especially if they are short and limited to purely humanitarian
objectives. Power writes that “[n]o U.S. president has ever made
genocide prevention a priority, and no U.S. president has ever
suffered politically for his indifference to its occurrence.”185 The
incentives to be overactive on humanitarian grounds (or
allegedly humanitarian grounds) appear to be rather small or
even non-existent. If America has a president who is willing to
misuse the military in the service of personal fame and glory, it
is doubtful that he will see humanitarian interventions as a way
to accomplish this goal.
Any statutory limits on presidential war power that actually
have been imposed by the WPR do not appear to have been
created with humanitarian interventions in mind. Koh makes
this argument explicitly, both in an article and in his Senate
testimony. In the former, he writes that “it seemed clear that
the focus of the War Powers Resolution was as a ‘No More
Vietnams’ statute, not a ‘Let’s Have More Rwandas’ statute.”186
In his Senate testimony, he asserted that “[w]e should not read
into the 1973 Congress’s adoption of what many have called a
‘No More Vietnams’ resolution an intent to require the
premature termination, nearly forty years later, of limited
military force in support of an international coalition to prevent
the resumption of atrocities in Libya.”187 Thus, even to the
extent that Congress has shown interest in dialing back
executive power in this area, it was probably not with the desire
to restrict presidential attempts to stop serious, large scale
human rights violations.
Reasons for Caution
This is not to say that there is nothing to fear from greater
presidential autonomy when it comes to making the decision to
intercede for humanitarian purposes; even seemingly legitimate
authority can be abused. While intervening in Rwanda, for
example, would have clearly been a valid humanitarian attempt
185. POWER, supra note 138, at xxi.
186. See Koh, supra note 43, at 991.
187. Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 12.
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to stop mass slaughter, not all claims may be similarly justified.
Russia’s recent actions in Georgia and Ukraine were both
defended on the desire to protect Russian nationals living in
those two countries,188 a claim that was viewed rather
skeptically throughout much of the world.189 The result is that,
as one commentator has put it:
While the legal concept of humanitarian
intervention may allow for a solution to an
immediate crisis, such as that in Syria, it may also
allow for an opportunist state, such as Russia, to
exploit the amorphous nature of morality to
justify an intervention into a coveted territory,
such as the Ukraine, for geographic or political
purposes.190
In fact, protecting one’s nationals abroad has been viewed
under some circumstances as a category of humanitarian
intervention.191
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
188. See, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, International Human Rights Law: An
Unexpected Threat to Peace, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 803, 811 (2018).
189. See, e.g., Adam Twardowski, Note, The Return of Novorossiya: Why
Russia’s Intervention in Ukraine Exposes the Weakness of International Law,
24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 351, 364 (2015) (noting that the Ukrainian Association of
International Law pointed out that “no duly authorized national, foreign or
international institution has declared any violation of human rights on the
territory of Ukraine, or specifically in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
which would have required the intervention of any subject of international law
or the international community” (internal citation omitted)). With regard to
Russia’s invasion of Georgia, see Robert P. Chatham, Defense of Nationals
Abroad: The Legitimacy of Russia’s Invasion of Georgia, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 75,
100–01 (2011) (stating “the imminence of the danger Russian nationals faced
is debatable at best. More significantly, the Russian citizens were very likely
voluntarily residing in South Ossetia and free to leave at any time as they had
Russian passports and lived in territory bordering Russia.” (internal citations
omitted)).
190. Shane Reeves, To Russia With Love: How Moral Arguments for a
Humanitarian Intervention in Syria Opened the Door for an Invasion of the
Ukraine, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 199, 212–13 (2014) (internal citations
omitted).
191. See, e.g., Chatham, supra note 189, at 91 (stating “[s]ome consider
humanitarian intervention to encompass defense of a state’s nationals abroad”
(internal citation omitted)). American intervention in Grenada in 1983 was
justified on the basis of a threat to American nationals. See, e.g., John Norton
Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 145,
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specifically referenced R2P in standing up for his country’s
engagements in Georgia192 and made similar-sounding
statements in justifying the invasion of Ukraine.193 While
Russia’s government may be less constrained by popular opinion
than America’s, this does not eliminate the possibility that
power may be abused by an American president who has lessthan-pure humanitarian motivations for acting. It is worth
noting that the one recent humanitarian intervention by the
United States that most clearly crossed the line into “hostilities”
that would trigger the WPR framework—Bosnia194—was said to
be motivated at least in part by President Clinton’s desire to
“look forceful”195 and concern with “his place in history.”196
Another factor that may lead to intervention, even when not
fully justified, is the greater ease with which some forms of
military action may be undertaken.
While technological
developments which result in a reduced threat to the lives of
American forces is a positive development, it may make it, in
effect, too easy to intervene. As Rebecca Crootof explains:
Drones, cyber operations, and other technological
advances in weaponry already allow the United
States to intervene militarily with minimal boots
on the ground, and increased autonomy in weapon
systems will further reduce risk to soldiers. As
human troops are augmented and supplanted by
robotic ones, one of the remaining incentives for
Congress to check presidential warmongering—
popular outrage at the loss of American lives—
will diminish. By making it politically easier to
justify the use of military force, autonomous
weapon systems will contribute to the growing
concentration of the war power in the hands of the
Executive, with potential implications for the

149–51 (1984).
192. See Twardowski, supra note 189, at 364 (internal citation omitted).
193. See id. at 363 (internal citation omitted).
194. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
195. See Treanor, supra note 18, at 771 n.440 (internal citation omitted).
196. See id. at 766 (internal citation omitted).
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humanitarian

When combined with the arguments for presidential
flexibility to initiate military activity that does not rise to the
level of “hostilities,” this has the potential to allow for
presidential freedom to engage in fairly serious military action
relatively free of oversight.198
This is an issue with implications that go far beyond the
impact on presidential war powers. Crootof mentions that there
have been calls for an international ban on autonomous weapons
precisely because they make war “too easy,”199 or, failing that, at
least regulation of their use.200 In particular, for liberal
democracies such as the United States, one of the limiting
factors in going to war is the potential political unpopularity of
a costly war. If this constraint is removed, then more peaceful
countries may generally feel less restrained in resorting to
force.201 As Dawn Johnsen observes, while the intervening
country may be glad to know that its own nationals are exposed
to less risk, this does not mean that concern should not be given
to casualties at the site of intervention:
In a situation in which the United States has the
capacity to devastate populations in another
country through air strikes without risk to
American lives, that potential loss of life must be
a relevant factor in determining whether the
intervention constitutes either “war” in the
constitutional sense or “hostilities” for purposes of
197. Rebecca Crootof, War, Responsibility, and Killer Robots, 40 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 909, 910–11 (2015).
198. See Bejesky, supra note 16, at 5–6 (quoting argument made by
former Bush adviser Jack Goldsmith that the claims made by the Obama
Administration in relation to its Libya intervention would mean that “the
[P]resident can wage war with drones and all manner of offshore missiles
without having to bother with the War Powers Resolution’s time limits”
(internal citation omitted)).
199. See Crootof, supra note 197, at 919–20.
200. See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1894–1903 (2015).
201. See Crootof, supra note 197, at 925.
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the War Powers Resolution (or both). Not to
consider foreign casualties inflicted by U.S. forces
would seem especially perverse in the context of
humanitarian interventions.202
Crootof concludes with regard to America specifically, that
while the existence of autonomous weapons will not greatly
increase a president’s ability to involve the United States in
what are likely to be major, long-term military conflicts, a
president may well feel that he has a freer hand when it comes
to short-term actions,203 a category that likely includes
interventions that are defended as being humanitarian in
nature.204 Thus, future occupants of the White House could be
increasingly tempted to intervene, even if a truly legitimate
basis for doing so is lacking, because it is both quick and easy to
do so, thereby removing previously existing checks on
presidential action. If we give presidents an additional basis for
military conflict, such as humanitarian intervention, and reduce
the costs for such action, there is certainly the potential for
abuse of authority.
Furthermore, Johnsen argues that
precedents that are generated in cases of humanitarian
intervention risk being applied in other contexts: “if we
recognize a humanitarian exception to the War Powers
Resolution, why not also a counterterrorism exception? Why not
a similar exception for military ‘first strikes’ to degrade nuclear
and other capabilities of nations controlled by extraordinarily
dangerous hands?”205
One response to this is to create explicit criteria for when
humanitarian intervention is justified. Such guidelines would
provide both a basis upon which to judge a state’s action and at
least some constraint to an executive before he decides to
intervene. The standards set out in PDD 25 discussed above 206
establish a high bar for American support of humanitarian
202. Dawn Johnsen, When Responsibilities Collide: Humanitarian
Intervention, Shared War Powers, and the Rule of Law, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1065,
1096 (2016) (internal citations omitted).
203. See Crootof, supra note 197, at 926–27.
204. See id. at 929–30.
205. Johnsen, supra note 202, at 1078.
206. See supra notes 176–82 and accompanying text.
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efforts. Koh supports some role for humanitarian intervention,
criticizing an “absolutist” conception of state sovereignty that
“tolerates gross atrocities.”207 However, Koh argues that a
failure to articulate a clear standard for when the default rule of
protecting state sovereignty must give way to a need to end
human rights abuses will cause mischief of its own.208 In
particular, he faults the Clinton Administration for failing to set
forth a standard that explained its decision to intervene in
Kosovo,209 a somewhat ironic criticism given the arguments that
the post-Somalia PDD 25 standards were alleged to be too hard
to meet—and perhaps they were.
There have been a number of attempts to develop
specifications for when humanitarian intervention is justified.
For example, in a 2014 letter, British officials set forth the
following considerations for interventions, even in the absence
of a Security Council resolution:
(i)

there is convincing evidence, generally
accepted by the international community as
a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress
on a large scale, requiring immediate and
urgent relief;
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no
practicable alternative to the use of force if
lives are to be saved; and
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary
and proportionate to the aim of relief of
humanitarian need and must be strictly
limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e. the
minimum necessary to achieve that end and
for no other purpose).210

207. See Koh, supra note 43, at 1014.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Letter from the Rt. Hon. Hugh Robertson MP, U.K. Minister of
State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, to the Rt. Hon. Sir Richard Ottaway
MP, U.K. House of Commons (Jan. 14, 2014) (on file with author); see also
Ashley Deeks, Commentary, Multi-Part Tests in the Jus Ad Bellum, 53 HOUS.
L. REV. 1035, 1058 (2016).
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Koh has his own benchmarks. In his view, in situations
where a humanitarian crisis threatens consequences
“significantly disruptive of international order,” which would
soon lead to “imminent threats” to the state(s) considering
intervening, and all other remedies have been exhausted or are
unavailable, including a Security Council resolution due to a
persistent veto by one of the P5, “limited force for genuinely
humanitarian purposes that was necessary and proportionate to
address the imminent threat [would be acceptable because it]
would demonstrably improve the humanitarian situation, and
would terminate as soon as the threat is abated.”211 Koh goes on
to say that any case for intervention would be strengthened to
the extent that intervening states could demonstrate that they
were acting collectively and that such action was necessary to
prevent the use of per se illegal means, such as chemical
weapons, or would help prevent a per se illegal end, such as
genocide or other mass slaughter.212 Koh’s criteria appear to be
narrower than the British version because they, in an echo of
PDD 25, tie any attempt to intervene to a threat to the
intervening country’s own national security.
Both of these proposals are written with an eye toward
defending a state’s action to the rest of the international
community. However, there is no reason that the principles they
enunciate—that (1) action should only come after other
alternatives have been exhausted, (2) action must be limited and
proportional to prevent or bring to a close serious human rights
abuses, and (3) it is better if intervention is undertaken by a
group, rather than a single state acting alone—cannot be used
as guideposts by a domestic audience judging the righteousness
of a president’s choice to intervene.
Koh argues that most legitimate humanitarian
interventions are unlikely to rise to the level of “hostilities” for
purposes of the WPR and, therefore, do not even implicate that
law.213 However, even beyond that question, the guidelines
suggested by Robertson and Koh provide standards by which to
judge a presidential decision to engage in humanitarian
intervention: How serious is the humanitarian risk? Is there an
211. Koh, supra note 43, at 1011 (emphasis in original).
212. See id.
213. See id. at 1015–16.
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impending threat to American interests if nothing is done? Has
the administration attempted to engage international
institutions and/or close allies? Do the actions appear to be
proportionate and restrained in scope and duration? If the
president’s actions do not measure up, then Congress can make
use of its own authority, whether by refusing to fund the
intervention or by using its investigative powers to attempt to
discern if the president has less-than-humanitarian motives in
play.
If the president knows ahead of time that his
administration will be forced to answer for its actions, this
should discourage adventurism dressed up as humanitarian
intervention. Thus, even a system that allows for presidential
authority to initiate humanitarian intervention is not a blank
check. Finally, it is important to note that while working with a
group of allies may be useful and increase the perceived
legitimacy of any intervention, the United States is not just any
country when it comes to commencing action. Power asserts that
American “leadership will be indispensable in encouraging U.S.
allies” to engage in humanitarian interventions.214 If the
president is constrained too much, then other countries may not
pick up the slack, with consequences that will reverberate
throughout the international community.
Conclusion
Interbranch fights related to military affairs have been with
us since the beginning of the Republic. Academic debates over
the meaning of the declare war clause of the Constitution
continue as well. It is not clear how much these debates tell us
about uses of force, not for military conquest or defense, but in
the name of preventing or ending serious human rights abuses.
Humanitarian interventions, in terms of their length and
casualty levels, may be commensurate with the more limited
214. See POWER, supra note 138, at 513 (explaining that similarly, even
though Professor Johnsen is wary of reading the WPR in a way to allow for
Presidents to initiate humanitarian interventions without congressional
assent, she writes that “[a]s a matter of policy, I embrace both the motivation
behind the R2P movement and the United States’ special responsibilities to
respond to humanitarian crises, including through interventions that involve
the use of military force in ‘extreme and limited circumstances.’”); Johnsen,
supra note 202, at 1069 (internal citation omitted).
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uses of military force that presidents have engaged in
throughout American history. However, they do not resemble
the sorts of defensive engagements or responses to emergency
situations that even the proponents of the restrictive viewpoint
would acknowledge as legitimate exercises of presidential
power, irrespective of a grant of congressional authorization.
It is proposed here that presidents be given at least some
flexibility to initiate military action in the name of humanitarian
intervention. While any decision to use military force brings
risks with it, using the military for humanitarian purposes
presents less of a hazard to our constitutional order. Such
actions tend to be of short duration and, as a result, involve less
threat to American life. When it comes to the issue of
presidential power, they do not provide the same “achieving
glory” incentives with regard to public opinion that other forms
of military action have typically presented to the president.
Thus, there is less reason to fear that authority to engage in
humanitarian intervention will be abused by the Commander in
Chief. Though, to the extent that this is a concern, we can look
to the sorts of standards suggested by Koh and Robertson as
means of judging the legitimacy of presidential action in this
arena to limit the chance that presidents will abuse their power.
In light of all of this, and in light of the terrible cost of inaction
in places like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, we should be
willing to live with some presidential freedom to use military
force to respond to serious human rights abuses.
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